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A RECENT federal district court order casts doubt on the permissibility of
holding public hearings in the course of an administrative investigation without
granting procedural safeguards to subpoenaed witnesses.' The order restrain-
ed an FTC Hearing Examiner from enforcing subpoenas directing officials of
a large midwestern grocery chain (The Kroger Co.) to appear, produce docu-
ments, and testify at public hearings in connection with the FTC's investiga-
tion of a milk price war in Indianapolis. 2 The Commission had denied Kroger's
motion that either the hearings be held in private or that "full representation
by counsel" be permitted.3 At previous public hearings Kroger's counsel had
been denied opportunity to call or cross-examine witnesses, introduce evidence,
or make statements and objections for the record.4
1. Hall v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) U 70338 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1962).
No final order was entered in the case. The initial eight-day restraining order was continued
until September 10, 1962 and argument was held on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary in-
junction. On June 20, 1962, however, the Commission withdrew the challenged subpoenas.
TRADE REG. REP. ff 10114.11. See also Archer v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. U 70417 (N.D. Ill.
July 20, 1962), discussed in note 54 infra.
2. The Kroger officials were originally subpoenaed along with those of two other in-
terstate grocery chains and six local supermarkets. FTC News Release, Feb. 28, 1962,
TRADE Ra. Rae. U 10114.10. After their objections to the Commission's procedures had
been overruled by the Hearing Examiner, they refused to participate further in the hear-
ings. The FTC then issued a second set of subpoenas to the Kroger officials alone, stating
that these were for the purpose of continuing its previous investigation. These subpoenas
were the subject of the District Court's restraining order. See FTC News Releases, April
27, and May 3, 1962, TADE REG. RaE. U 10114.11.
3. Hall v. Lemke, supra note 1.
4. The FTC's rules for investigatory proceedings in effect during the Indianapolis
hearings provided in pertinent part that:
Any party compelled to testify or to produce documentary evidence may be ac-
companied and advised by counsel, but counsel may not, as a matter of right, other-
wise participate in the investigation.
FTC PROCEDUREs, RULES OF PRACTICE, AND ORDERS § 1A0, 20 Fed. Reg. 3057 (1955)
(superseded June 1, 1962). Presumably both the Hearing Examiner and the Commission
were relying on this rule in denying the rights claimed by plaintiffs. Brief for Defendant,
pp. 7-8,13, Hall v. Lenke, supra note 1.
The FTC's current rules for investigative proceedings took effect on June 1, 1962, 27
Fed. Reg. 4609-23 (May 16, 1962), shortly after the issue of the restraining order in the
Hall case. These rules leave the former provision unchanged for nonpublic investigations,
but provide further that witnesses compelled to testify at public hearings:
may be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel: Providcd, however, that
such representation shall not include the right to call, examine or cross-e.x-amine
witnesses, or adduce evidence.
Id. at 4610. The FTC Chairman subsequently indicated that in practical effect, the Coin-
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In seeking the order Kroger contended that since the hearings would involve
express and implied accusations of illegal conduct, it would be a denial of due
process to hold the hearing in public without providing adequate opportunity
for rebuttal. 5 Kroger also argued that the proceeding was unauthorized because
the Federal Trade Commission Act does not give the FTC power to use public
hearings in its investigations. 6 The Commission contended in turn that the
trial-type procedural safeguards sought by Kroger were not constitutionally
required in investigative, as distinguished from adjudicatory, proceedings 1 and
that the procedural safeguard of holding the hearing in private was not re-
quired by the act.8 The district court's restraining 0 order, issued without a
mission's newly-created "right to representation" in public hearings may be limited to the
"noting of proper objections to questions." FTC News Release, July 6, 1962. The Com-
mission had already offered to grant Kroger's counsel this right upon the resumption of the
Indianapolis hearings. Brief for Defendant, p. 13, Hall v. Lemke, supra.
A Federal District Court recently enjoined enforcement of FTC subpoenas for a nots-
public investigative hearing on the ground that Rule § 1A0, when construed to deny plain-
tiff's counsel opportunity to present concise objections on the record to questions deemed im-
proper, did not comply with § 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958), which the court held applicable to the Commission's
nonpublic investigative proceedings. Wanderer v. Kaplan, TPAD REG. Rm,. (1962 Trade
Cas.) J 70535 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1962). Apparently responding in part to this decision, the
FTC recently decided by a 3-2 vote to modify its practices in nonpublic invcstigative
hearings to permit presentation of objections on the record and to expand generally the
role of witnesses' counsel. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 4, col. 3. Thus there would
not appear at present to be any significant difference in practice between the witness' pro-
cedural rights in public and nonpublic investigations.
5. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3, 27-28, Hall v. Lemke, supra note 1. See Letter from John de
J. Pemberton, Jr., Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, to Paul Rand
Dixon, Chairman of the FTC, April 20, 1962, on file at Yale Law Library.
6. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 17-26, Hall v. Lemke, supra note 1.
7. Brief for Defendant, pp. 25-31, Hall v. Lemke, supra note 1. The Commission based
this contention primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420
(1960), discussed infra at notes 28-42.
8. Brief for Defendant, pp. 18-25, 31-33, Hall v. Lemke, supra note 1. The FTC did
not argue that statutory authority for public hearings had been specifically granted. It cited
SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948), where the District Court indicated that
the choice between open or closed hearings "must rest in the sound discretion of the agency
created by the Congress, and not with the courts... ." Id. at 229. Though the opinion does
not deal explicitly with the question of procedural safeguards, it appears also from the state-
ment of facts by Morris, J., that opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses had been
denied at the hearing. Id. at 227. In Harrison the court refused injunctive relief against a
public investigation where the plaintiff attorneys had been compelled to testify about an
alleged collusive suit against a company issuing stock so that an underwriting company could
take advantage of an "escape clause." See also Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th
Cir. 1952) (suit under Federal Tort Claims Act dismissed under exception for discretion-
ary powers where stockholder claimed injury from publication of facts surrounding SEC's
investigation of Tucker (three-wheel automobile) Corporation and the release of a con-
fidential report to the press).
The District Court in Harrison did not cite any case law or other authority for its view
that the choice of public or private hearings is entirely a matter of agency discretion, nor did
it otherwise explicate the considerations impelling it to reach this conclusion. Though it
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discussion of the underlying rationale, stated that holding public hearings with-
out permitting "full representation by counsel" would jeopardize the company's
good will and subject it to "irreparable" economic injury.'(
Though the court did not make explicit the grounds of its decision, the case
would appear to raise an issue of constitutional dimension: In what kind of
agency proceedings does due process of law require that persons be protected
by either executive hearings or trial-type safeguards against the impact of
adverse publicity arising from the proceeding? Frequently recognized in ad-
ministrative law is a distinction between adjudicatory proceedings-those in
which findings of fact serve as the basis for the imposition of official sanctions
or other action affecting a "substantive right""i-where the traditional trial-
type safeguards of procedural due process have been found to apply,la and
investigatory proceedings-where such safeguards have been found unneces-
sary.'3 A further distinction seems relevant in determining what due process
could conceivably have relied on Wooley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614 (1938), that case held only that § 21 of the Securities Act of
1933 ("All hearings shall be public.. ."), 48 Stat. 86, 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1958), does not pre-
vent the SEC from holding investigative hearings it private. Furthermore, there is some
indication in the Harrison opinion that the court regarded the question of public versus
closed hearings as incidental to what it conceived as the central issue; viz., whether the at-
torney-client privilege was applicable in the investigative proceeding. Id. at 230. Thus
qualified, the case does not seem to be persuasive authority for the position that agencies may
hold public investigative hearings in their sole discretion.
9. The court stated that the plaintiffs had been threatened with criminal penalties under
Section 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § S0
(1958), and indicated that this in itself might have been a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief in advance of attempted enforcement by the Commission. Hall v.
Lemke, supra note 1. Compare United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 285 F2d 607, 615-16
(2d Cir. 1960), aff'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 208, 225-27 (1961) with FTC v. Claire
Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927). The latter case was criticized in Handler, The Con-
stitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission I, 28 CoLum-. L REv.
708, 714-20 (1928).
10. This Note does not deal with the showing of probable irreparable injury which should
be prerequisite to injunctive relief against a public investigative hearing or to a refusal to
enforce agency subpoenas for such hearings. The assumption ihat the threat of harm is
sufficient to warrant injunctive relief is made throughout in order to preserve the focus on
the constitutional issues raised by public proceedings without safeguards. Courts might be
more likely to question the likelihood and extent of injury in the context of economic in-
vestigations like that involved in the principal case, particularly where the conduct in-
vestigated, though potentially illegal, is not widely disapproved by the public. But see United
States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Monograph on the
Federal Trade Commission, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940), and Rourke,
Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CHL L. REv. 225, 231-38 (1957), a useful
treatment of the "publicity sanction" as it relates to various areas of governmental activity
and of the factors on which its efficacy may depend.
11. See 1 DAvis, ADmiNasTriAvr LAW TREATrsE § 7.02 (1958).
12. Morgan v. United States, 304 U:S. 1, 14, 18-19 (1938); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 496-97 (1959) (dictum); see ATT'Y GEN. Commns. ADMiN. PRoC. REP'. 62 (1941) ; Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, § 7(c), 60"stat. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1958).
13. See Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1944); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330,
333 (1957) ; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446-48 (1960), discussed at notes 28-42 infra;
cf. Note, 58 CoLtrm. L. REv. 395, 401-03 (1958).
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demands in an "investigative" proceeding, like the FTC hearing involved in
the instant case. An investigation may be designed principally to gather in-
formation as a basis for formulating administrative rules or proposing legisla-
tion to the Congress, or it may be designed to uncover facts about specific per-
sons in preparation for an administrative prosecution. Existing case law does
not provide direct support for a distinction between the requirements of pro-
cedural due process in informing and pre-prosecutorial hearings. An examina-
tion of the doctrines which protect against possible adverse publicity in other
governmental proceedings-such as congressional investigations and grand jury
hearings-indicates, however, that this distinction should be recognized in
determining what process is due in agency non-adjudicatory proceedings. The
utility of such a distinction is that it directs attention to the critical factors
which must be weighed in formulating procedural requirements that strike a
proper balance between the individual's need for protection against extra-
official sanctions and the government's interest in gathering information and
generating consent for governmental action.
While the Supreme Court, in reviewing congressional contempt actions
against recalcitrant witnesses, has taken note of the extra-official deprivations
produced by compelled disclosures and the testimony of adverse witnesses,14
it has never explicitly explored the relationship between the denial of pro-
cedural safeguards 15 in congressional hearings and the possibilities of harm
through publicity. Thus the Court has not used its jurisdiction over contempt
convictions as a vehicle for exercising judicial control over the ground-rules
of congressional investigations or for placing limits on the use of public hear-
ings.16 While the Court's reluctance to intervene in this area probably stems
in part from deference toward a coordinate branch of government, 17 it may be
inferred from the Court's frequent stress on the broad "informing" function of
Congress 18 that its attitude bears a considerable relation to the distinction
14. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957).
15. On the extent to which procedural safeguards are denied in congressional in-
vestigations, see, e.g., Rauh & Pollitt, Right to and Nature of Representation be/ore Con-
gressionol Committees, 45 MINN. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1961) ; Galloway, Congressional In.
vestigations: Proposed Reforms, 18 U. CI. L. REv. 478, 480-82, 490-502 (1951) (examin-
ing various legislative proposals and suggested reforms to provide safeguards for witnesses).
16. See Taylor, Judicial Review of Legislative Investigations, 29 Nomre DAME LAW.
242, 275-76 (1954) ; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 497 (1960) (dissenting opinion) ; cf.
United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407, 408 (D.D.C. 1952). The issue of judicial con-
trol over the procedures of congressional committees was raised in Kleinman, a case arising
out of the Kefauver Crime Committee hearings, when the defendant resisted an indictment
for contempt on the ground that the use of live television at the hearings, as permitted by
the Committee's Rules, was a denial of due process. The court rejected this contention, but
dismissed the indictment after finding that defendant's refusal to answer was justified be-
cause of the "disturbing" and "distracting" elements in the hearing room. See also Note, 26
TEMP. L. Q. 70 (1952) ; Note, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1072 (1953).
17. See Taylor, supra note 16 at 277, 283.
18. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-80 (1927); see Barenblatt v. United




proposed above. Some opinions imply that this function serves to inform the
public as well as the Congress.19 When the legislature uses its investigative
powers to inform the public, it stimulates a flow of further information and
preferences from the public which may decisively influence legislative views as
to the necessity and character of prospective enactments. Since such channels
of communication are increasingly vital to the work-ability of modem repre-
sentative government, the Court may be reluctant to obstruct congressional
investigations with trial-type procedures or to divert their course by requir-
ing dosed hearings. Under this interpretation of the Court's decisions, the
witness' protection against adverse publicity and his opportunity for defense
against charges appears extremely attenuated in a congressional proceeding
that is designed to inform,m because of the necessity and importance of the
informing function.2'
The grand jury investigation may be contraposed to the congressional in-
quiry, since the former is employed primarily to secure prosecutorial informa-
tion.22 Grand jury proceedings provide few trial-type procedural safeguards
for potential subjects of indictmenti but are traditionally,2 4 and perhaps
constitutionally, - 5 required to be held in private. Where accusations or suspi-
cions are found lacking in reasonable foundation, they are withheld entirely
from the public. If an indictment is returned after an cx partc grand jury pro-
ceeding, the subject may well be exposed to extra-official sanctions.20 And
although the indictment is not the product of a full adversary proceeding, its
19. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,43 (1953) ; Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 187 n.8, 200 r33 (1957) ; WiLsox, CONGR.ssIohA. GovERrssihT 303 (7th ed.
1890).
20. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959) ; Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399, 410, 414-15 (1961).
21. This conclusion and the analysis developed in this paragraph are based considerably
on the discussion in BIcxmL, THE LE.AsT DANGEROUS BRaNcH 156-64 (1962).
22. See BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION 71 (1955).
23. Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 Y,.s LJ. 637,
700 (1932); A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1190-91 (1960).
24. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943) ; United States v. Costello,
350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) ; see FED. R. CRim. P. § 6(e).
25. Application of United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 861, 865-70 (1953). The
violation of secrecy in this case consisted in disclosing to the press the names of thirteen
union offiicials who had been investigated concerning the non-Communist affidavits they
had filed pursuant to former § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act and in the publication of a
special "presentment" alleging that the officials had committed perjury in filing the affi-
davits. Judge Weinfeld emphasized particularly the interrelationship bet,een harm through
adverse publicity and the absence of procedural safeguards in grand jury investigations:
Protection of those against whom the prosecution cannot in ex parte proceedings make
out a sufficient case to wvarrant indictment is defeated when the fact of suspicion and
the proceedings had thereon before the Grand Jury are given widespread publicity in
a report.... The damage ensuing from specific reports results ... from disregard of
the traditional safeguards of an adversary proceeding and public hearing.
Id. at 866, 868.
26. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 590 n.6 (1963).
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impact arguably is reduced by the fact that it is not preceded by repeated and
detailed public accusations of wrongdoing. Consistent with the presumption of
innocence operative in criminal cases, the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding
keeps at a minimum the imposition of pre-trial unofficial sanctions.27 Since
the prosecutor is not specifically charged with the responsibility of develop-
ing legislative recommendations or directly prescribing rules of conduct, the
restrictions which secrecy imposes on the flow of information between his
office and the public at the investigative stage of prosecution thus represent a
desirable form of protection against the extra-official sanctions which would
otherwise accompany the proceeding.
In Hannah v. Larche 28 the Supreme Court dealt extensively for the first
time with the question of witnesses' protection in federal administrative in-
vestigations.29 The Court considered the applicability of trial-type procedural
safeguards, such as cross-examination, notice of charges, and confrontation,
in the investigative proceedings of the Civil Rights Commission where in-
voluntary witnesses claimed that their appearance and testimony at certain
public hearings 3o would subject them to severe extra-official sanctions. The
27. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
28. 363 U.S. 420 (1960). The case has been analyzed at length in two articles by Dean
Newman: Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 735 (1961);
and Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Wilness, 60
Mrice. L. REV. 169, 173-80 (1961).
29. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), held 5-4 that witnesses subpoenaed to testify
in an investigation conducted by a state Fire Marshal were not entitled to the presence or
participation of their counsel. In excluding counsel, the Marshal had acted under a statu-
tory provision which permitted, but did not require him, to hold the investigative proceeding
in private. The Court stated that the proceeding was not adjudicatory in nature, but designed
"to elicit facts relating to the causes and circumstances of the fire"-accordingly, the wilt-
nesses' rights were sufficiently protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, Id. at
332-33. In concurring, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the distinction between "a secret in-
quisition of those suspected of arson" and a "general administrative non-prosecutorial in-
quiry into the causes of fire," which he considered to be the proper construction of the pro-
ceeding authorized in the Ohio statute. Id. at 336, 337 (concurring opinion).
Groban was followed in. 1959 by Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), another 5-4
case. The Court held that witnesses in a state judicial inquiry concerning alleged ambulance-
chasing among members of the local bar were not denied due process when the presiding
judge required their counsel to remain outside the hearing room, but permitted the witnesses
to consult freely with counsel during the interrogation. The Court placed some emphasis on
the protective function performed by secrecy in the circumstances, id. at 291-92, and stated
that Groban was controlling on the issue of a constitutional right to the presence and partici-
pation of counsel. Id. at 295-96.
The majority opinion in Hannah v. Larche, supra note 28, relegated both cases to a
footnote because of "significant differences between them and the instant litigation" and
because it viewed the result in Hannah as "supported by other considerations." Id. at 451
n.31. Justices Harlan and Clark, however, thought that the Groban and Baker dccisions were
totally dispositive of the issues presented in Hannah. Id. at 485 (concurring opinion).
30. The plaintiffs in Hannah, like the Kroger officials in Hall v. Lemke, 5 TRADE R o,
REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 1 70338 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1962), had sought declaratory relief
against a scheduled investigative hearing. Neither the Supreme Court nor the District
Court opinion in Hannah states explicitly that the hearings were to be public, but Justices
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Court 31 held that there was no constitutional right to the procedural safe-
guards of a trial in the Commission's investigations. In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court stated that the commission's primary function vras to gafher
information and that its investigations were not a prelude to criminal prosecu-
tion or other proceedings leading to official deprivations. Thus the introduc-
tion of procedural safeguards would have only a disruptive effect on the Com-
mission's hearings 3 2 In answering the argument that protection against po-
tential extra-official deprivations was required, the Court stated that:
... even if such collateral consequences were to flow from the Commis-
sion's investigations, they would not be the result of any affirmative de-
terminations made by the Commission, and they would not affect the
legitimacy of the Commission's investigative function. 33
This crucial passage of the opinion suggests that the Court, while relying
chiefly on the "informing" nature of the Commission's proceedings, was seek-
ing also to place its holding on a broader ground. The Court's theory with
regard to extra-official deprivations appears to be that witnesses are not en-
titled to protection against these deprivations unless the proceeding which
generates them eventuates in an "affirmative determination," a quasi-verdict
of guilt that triggers public opprobrium. Under this theory, the witness'
right to protection would depend not on the extent to which the proceeding
was designed to serve an informing purpose, but on whether it led either to
official deprivations ("punishment") or to a final official determination ("ver-
dict"). The Court did not make clear whether a focused pre-prosecutorial
hearing, in which information is sought to determine if a prosecution against
specific individuals should ensue, falls within the latter category. Since pre-
prosecutorial and informing hearings traditionally have been classified indis-
criminately under the rubric of investigative proceedings, and since the Court
apparently refused to inquire into the specific purpose of the proposed hearings
in Hannah, it is not likely that the Court was making a distinction between
these two types of investigative proceedings in that case. Thus Hannah may
be read as holding that if the hearings are not adjudicative in the traditional
sense of that term, conducting an administrative proceeding in public and
without trial-type safeguards does not raise due process questions, even though
Frankfurter, id. at 492 (concurring opinion), and Douglas, id. at 496 (dissenting opinion),
noted that the Civil Rights Commission was authorized to hold public hearings. The Dis-
trict Court's emphasis on the potential injury to the witnesses' reputations, Larche v. Han-
nah, 177 F. Supp. 816, 822, 828 (W.D. La. 1959) also would seem to support the inference
that the Commissions scheduled hearings were to be public. FTC and Kroger's counsel
disagreed on this point. Compare Reply Brief for Plaintiff, p. 28, with Brief for Defendant,
p. 27, Hall v. Lemke, supra. The FTC, however, introduced an affidavit from the Civil
Rights Commission's General Counsel stating that the hearings involved in Hannah were
to be public. Reply Brief for Defendant. p. 9, Hall v. Lemke, .upra.
31. The decision was by a majority of seven to two. Though joining the opinion of the
Court, Justices Harlan and Clark also filed a brief concurring opinion. See note 29 supra.
Mr. justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, and Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
32. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,443 (1960).
33. Ibid.
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an "informing" purpose has not been established.84 The majority thus dis-
tinguished Joint Anti-fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,3 5 a case which
lends support to the view that some requirements of procedural due process
are applicable where an administrative "determination" actuates an extra-
official sanctioning process.30 The distinguishing feature of Anti-fascist, accord-
ing to the Court in Hannah, was that the Attorney General's ex parte designa-
tion of the complainant organizations as "Communist" was tantamount to an
"adjudication."3 7
In his concurring opinion in Hannah, Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed with
34. The majority's treatment in dictum of the FTC's rules for investigative proceed-
ings-see note 4 supra-and those of other regulatory agencies such as the SEC suggests
that it did not regard the distinction between informing and pre-adjudicative hearings as
one of constitutional significance. Id. at 446-48. The Court stated that:
We have found no authorities suggesting that the rules governing Federal Trade
Commission investigations violate the Constitution, and this is understandable since
any person investigated by the Federal Trade Commission will be accorded all the
traditional judicial safeguards at a subsequent adjudicative proceeding.
Id. at 446. See also FCC v. Schreiber, 201 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D. Cal. 1962) ; Alabama
ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848, 854 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
The significance of this dictum in the present context is arguably reduced by the fact
that it antedates the FTC's recently-instituted practice of holding pre-prosecutorial hear-
ings in public. See note 49 infra. The Hannah majority, however, appears to have been
equally insensitive to the possibility of a critical distinction between public and private
hearings without safeguards, as reflected by its reliance on the procedures of both grand
juries, Hannah v. Larche, supra note 31 at 448-49, and congressional investigations, id. at
444-45, in support of its holding.
The theory of this Note is not inconsistent with either the result in Hannah or the
Court's approach to the functions of the Civil Rights Commission. The Note does rest, how-
ever, on a rejection of some of the broader implications of the Hannah opinion. See also
text at notes 38-42 infra.
35. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
36. In Anti-fascist the Attorney General had designated the three petitioner organiza-
tions as "Communist" without giving them notice or hearing; the organizations claimed that
their membership and financial support had been impaired as a result of the consequent in-
jury to their reputations. There a fragmented majority of five Justices agreed that the
District Courts had erred in dismissing the organizations' suits for declaratory and in-
junctive relief. There was no opinion of the Court, but Mr. Justice Douglas joined Mr.
Justice Burton in the view that the Attorney General had admitted his designation to be
"patently arbitrary" (and therefore in excess of his authority under the Executive Order
establishing the loyalty program) in his motion to dismiss. Joint Anti-fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, supra note 35 at 136-42. In a separate opinion, however, Justice
Douglas agreed with Justices Black, id. at 142-50, and Frankfurter, id. at 150-74, who
also wrote separate opinions, that the summary designation procedure was unconstitutional.
Id. at 174-79.
Justice Jackson was the only member of the majority adhering to a rigid distinction be-
tween sanctions imposed by "public disapproval" and those imposed "by law." Id. at 184.
Though he agreed that it was a denial of due process "to promulgate with force of law it
conclusive finding of disloyalty, without hearing . . . " id. at 186, he characterized the
organizations' right to relief upon their own claim as "very dubious," id. at 184, and
joined the majority only because he thought the designated organizations were entitled to
vindicate the rights of government employees who were subject to discharge for mem-
bership. Id. at 186-87.
37. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452 (1960).
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the majority that the Commission's function was investigative rather than ad-
judicative, for it had no power to pass official adverse judgments on indivi-
duals; its responsibility was "to gather information as a solid foundation for
legislative action," and its rules manifested an adequate adherence to this
limited investigative responsibility.38 In discussing the relationship of the Anti-
fascist case to the issues before the Court, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
did not accept the absence of an official determination in Hannah as a sufficient
ground of distinction.39 He developed the contrast between the two situations
more fully and relied considerably on section 102(e) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1957, which provides that:
If the Commission determines that evidence or testimony at any hearing
may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate any person, it shall (1) re-
ceive such evidence or testimony in executive session; ...and (3) re-
ceive and dispose of requests from such persons to subpoena additional
witnesses.
40
Thus, he stressed that this provision was a "safeguard against injury to per-
sons who appear in public hearings." 41 This emphasis on the effort of Congress
to provide a measure of protection against possible extra-official deprivations
implicitly rejects the view that protection against such deprivations is not a
relevant due process consideration where an element of official "determination"
or "deprivation" is absent.4
Accepting justice Frankfurter's implicit contention that deprivations gener-
ated by agency proceedings are no less worthy of judicial protection because
they do not flow directly from official determinations, the denial of protec-
38. Id. at 488-89, 492-93 (concurring opinion).
39. See id. at 490-92 (concurring opinion).
40. 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(e) (1958). Section 102(g) of the Act
provides that ".... evidence or testimony taken in executive session may (not] be released or
used in public sessions without the consent of the Commission. Whoever releases or uses
in public without the consent of the Commission evidence or testimony taken in executive
session shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year." 71
Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(g) (1958).
41. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 492 (1960) (concurring opinion). There is some
reason to question the strength of § 102(e) as a safeguard, however. Under its terms, the
duty of the Commission to receive testimony in executive session arises if the Commission
determines that the testimony may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person. Even
though the Commission's duty can readily be construed as mandatory by taking the condi-
tional expression to refer to the outcome rather than to the making of the determination, the
problem of framing a procedure and standards for some measure of judicial control, how-
ever modest, has to be solved before the protection can be deemed adequate. But the statute
provides no guidelines for judicial review and § 102(g)-see note 40 supra-appears to
complicate the problem by its suggestion that the Commission's "consent" is a sufficient
basis for the lawful release of testimony taken in executive session.
42. See also Joint Anti-fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 157-61
(1951) (concurring opinion), and id. at 173-74:
Nor does [the Attorney General] obtain immunity on the ground that designation is
not an "adjudication" or a "regulation" in the conventional use of those terms. Due
process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights have
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tion may nevertheless be justified in certain circumstances. The "informing"
function with characterizes congressional hearings may be exercised most ef-
fectively through public hearings without trial-type procedural obstructions.
An agency which is authorized to conduct investigations and to gather in-
formation for rule-making or recommending legislation has a valid interest in
pursuing this objective. In such investigations a primary function of the pro-
cess is to reach an external audience which includes the Congress, those seg-
ments of the public which are primarily affected by the agency's regulatory
policies, and the body politic itself. While the use of public hearings is not
strictly necessary for the dissemination of the information produced, the pub-
licity generated by the gathering of raw data may contribute substantially to
the effectiveness of the informing process. It is true that the informing purpose
of a hearing is not a complete safeguard against the dissemination of consider-
able "misinformation" to the public which may result in harm to witnesses or
others. While this possibility reduces the weight of the "informing" justifica-
tion in pairticular instances, it does not appear to be a sufficient reason for
disallowing public hearings or imposing a general requirement that the safe-
guards of a trial be provided where the agency's genuine concern is to develop
information for prescribing or proposing future rules of conduct. Thus, the
reasons that have led the Court not to impose procedural safeguards on con-
gressional hearings that serve the informing function should lead to the same
result where an administrative agency undertakes hearings that serve the same
function.
But all agency non-adjudicatory proceedings are not intended to give con-
tent to or generate consent for rule-making or legislative proposals. An agency
which is authorized to enforce regulatory legislation also investigates conduct
suspected of violating the statute before committing itself to a full-scale ad-
ministrative prosecution. Investigations designed to gather information upon
which a determination of whether to prosecute specific individuals is to be
based, though sometimes procedurally resembling hearings designed to inform,
are pre-prosecutorial proceedings which serve a different purpose from what
may be termed pre-legislative investigations. Although the quantum of harm
to an individual in the form of injury to reputation flowing from both types of
proceedings may be identical in some circumstances, the reasons for denying
due process procedural safeguards in hearings intended to inform are far more
compelling than in the case of pre-prosecutorial investigations. Such investiga-
tions are strikingly similar in purpose to grand jury proceedings and the rea-
sons adumbrated above for requiring grand jury proceedings 43 to be conducted
heretofore been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fairness ....
While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it
is also a living principle not confined to past instances.
43. The inveterate analogy to the grand jury in judicial discussions of the power of
administrative investigation is not always a happy one. See United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) ("[a]n administrative agency charged with seeing that
the laws are enforced .... has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is
not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does
1236 [Vol. 72:1227
INVESTIGATIONS
en camera would seem applicable also to pre-prosecutorial administrative in-
vestigations, 44 at least where such investigations are likely to generate substan-
tial adverse publicity against a particular individual. 45
It might be argued that a pre-prosecutorial administrative proceeding differs
in an important respect from the typical grand jury investigation. Though
the probable existence of facts constituting a statutory violation is a primary
focus of the agency's inquiry, other considerations, such as the prevalence of
the particular practice and its importance in relation to the statutory objec-
tives, will also enter into the agency's decision to prosecute. The argument,
however, fails to observe that a grand jury proceeding frequently serves a
similar function by supplying the prosecutor with information which goes be-
yond probable cause for prosecuting a particular individual. 0 This information
enables the prosecutor to make an initial evaluation of the extent of a particu-
lar criminal practice, the impact of such behavior on the community, the
difficulties of proving and punishing the behavior under existing law, and so
forth. This kind of information may be essential to a determination of the most
effective means of employing the limited resources available to any prosecu-
torial agency.
An agency's need for a public hearing in order to obtain information and
views on the broader problems, however, should not be conclusive where there
is a substantial probability of a harmful extra-official impact on the sub-
jects of the investigation.47 Much of the information that is relevant to the
agency's estimate of the scope of the practices under investigation and their
not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the lav is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is
not") See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946), a
milestone along the path to virtual abdication of effective judicial control of agency sub-
poenas.
44. Cf. Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1944) ; In re SEC, 14 F. Supp. 417,
419 (S.D. N.Y. 1936), aff'd, 84 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir.), rev'd as moot stb noain. Bracken v.
SEC, 299 U.S. 504 (1936). The result of requiring that federal agency investigations be held
in private under certain circumstances, of course, would not be a true "star chamber" pro-
ceeding. Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act grants "any person com-
pelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof ... the right to be
accompanied, represented and advised by counsel . . ." 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1005(a) (1958). This section has been held applicable to administrative investigations,
United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Corm 1949), and to the nonpublic investiga-
tions of the FTC. Wanderer v. Kaplan, TRADn REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) f 70535
(D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1962). Thus traditional hostility to secret inquisitorial proceedings out-
side the grand jury context, see, e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337-47, 351-53 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion), would not seem to be appropriately directed toward a private investiga-
tion conducted by an agency subject to the requirements of the APA.
45. In Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), discussed in note 29 supra, the Court
indicated that secrecy was particularly appropriate as a protection of individual reputation
in an investigation touching on the activities of members of the bar. See id. at 291-92
(quoting Chief Judge Cardozo in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 478-79,
162 N.E. 487, 492 (1928)).
46. See Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 Hrtv. L. REv. 590 (1961).
47. See note 10 supra.
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impact throughout its regulatory jurisdiction can be developed through its
power to require the filing of reports by the businesses or other persons sub-
ject to its control.48 This information can be supplemented by depositions and
oral testimony in private proceedings. While a private proceeding is less like-
ly to apprise members of the public that the agency is considering a problem
concerning which they may have information to offer, the use of official an-
nouncements and press releases should enable the agency to reach a significant
segment of the interested public.
These considerations suggest that a regulatory agency's efforts to make
optimum use of its enforcement machinery would not be severely hampered by
a requirement that pre-prosecutorial investigations be held in private.40 The
goal of minimizing the occurrence of extra-official deprivations prior to an of-
ficial finding that statutory violations have been committed is, of course, the
justification for this limitation on the use of public hearings. While sonie pre-
judgment of guilt is certain to occur in the course of an agency investiga-
tion as a result of announcements that the investigation has been ordered or
that an adjudicatory proceeding will take place,r0 the impact of extra-official
deprivations should not be accentuated by a public proceeding in which safe-
guards are denied.
48. Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act gives the Commission power to:
require, by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce . . . to file
with the commission in such form as the commission may prescribe annual or special,
or both annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific questions,
furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as to the organization,
business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations, partner-
ships, and individuals of the respective corporations filing such reports or answers in
writing.
38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958).
49. Until recently the FTC itself has apparently followed a uniform practice of hold-
ing its pre-prosecutorial investigations in private. See address by Paul Rand Dixon,
Marquette Law School Annual Banquet, May 2, 1962, printed as The Federal Trade Cor-
nission: Its Fact-finding Responsibilities and Powers, 46 MARQ. L. Rsv. 17, 27 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Dixon-, The Federal Trade Commission] ; cf. TAxDE REG. Rr,. q 50117
(1962).
In its rules, the Commission has provided for public hearings without formal distine-
tion among the various types of investigations. The present rule provides that "investigative
proceedings shall not be public" unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, while the
rule in effect from 1955 to 1962 provided that "all investigatory hearings shall be non-
public" unless otherwise ordered. Compare FTC PRoCEDUREs, RULES OF PRAtcTIc, ANID
ORDERs § 1.41, 27 Fed. Reg. 4610 (May 16, 1962), with § 1.41, 20 Fed. Reg. 3057 (1955)
(superseded June 1, 1962). It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which this nuance re-
flects a change in FTC policy to favor a more active use of public hearings. But see note 54
infra.
50. In E. Griffith Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F. 2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933), the court denied
injunctive relief against a scheduled public hearing where the FTC had issued a formal con-
plaint charging the petitioner with unfair competition through fraudulent advertising. The
court rejected petitioner's contention that the FTC's function was "wholly inquisitorial" and
"necessarily secret" until final determination, stating that "where ... the possibility of loss
is founded wholly on the public knowledge that an investigation has been ordered, no good
reason exists or can be shown why the public hearing should not continue." Id. at 363-64.
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A requirement that such safeguards as the right to cross-examine and to
introduce evidence in rebuttal be granted when pre-prosecutorial investiga-
tions are held in public offers a possible alternative to private hearings as a
means of protecting witnesses. These adversary practices would be consistent
with the fact-finding goals of the investigation and thus might further be justi-
fied as a safeguard against ill-founded adjudicatory proceedings which sub-
ject persons to unwarranted notoriety. It is far from dear, however, that trial-
type safeguards are necessary for a fair determination that the probability of
certain facts is sufficient to warrant further proceedings. Where a determina-
tion adverse to the subject of the investigations leads only to a civil proceeding
for a cease-and-desist order against further violations of a regulatory statute
and not to a criminal trial, the quantum and reliability of evidence upon which
the decision to prosecute is based and the consequences of a prosecution itself
appear to be far less significant. Thus, trial-type procedures, which primarily
insure the validity of the decision to prosecute rather than effectively minimize
adverse publicity arising from statements made in a public proceeding, do not
seem necessary in administrative pre-prosecutorial investigations. Moreover, if
an agency's interest in an expeditious determination of whether to prosecute is
thwarted by making the preliminary investigation a replica of a formal ad-
judication, agencies may by-pass the preliminary investigation and proceed
to adjudicate in situations where a preliminary investigation might otherwise
have been ordered. In light of these considerations, secrecy would appear to
represent the more appropriate, as well as the more effective, form of pro-
tection against the harmful impact of accusatory testimony in pre-prosecutorial
investigations.
Given the importance of purpose as a determinant of agency need foropublic
proceedings without safeguards under the analysis here proposed, what criteria
may be used for ascertaining this factor? The lack of authority for the dis-
tinction between investigations which serve a general informing function and
those which are bent on the discovery of prosecutorial information suggests
that courts have been willing to assume that all non-adjudicatory proceedings
serve a valid informing function or that they have regarded the distinction as
irrelevant to the requirements of due process. The distinction is not limited in
its applicability to the investigations of multi-purpose regulatory agencies, since
congressional hearings may in fact serve as pre-prosecutorial investigations.al
The prospects for its workable application, however, are greater in the ad-
ministrative arena. The institutional stratification of the typical administrative
agency is itself an initial guide; initiation of an investigation by a particular
branch of the agency or the selection of particular personnel to conduct the
proceeding will suggest its purpose. The circumstances of the FTC's Kroger
Since the public proceeding was to be adjudicatory in nature, however, the petitioner had a
right to the trial-type hearing provided for by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Section
5(b), 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958). See also Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
bldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 47-48, 51-52 (1938).
51. See, e.g., BARTH, GovERNMENT BY INVEsTIGATIO-; 77-79 (1955).
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hearings illustrate some further indicia of purpose. The language in the Com-
mission's announcement at the outset of the milk-pricing hearings, and in its
subpoenas to Kroger and other involved companies, indicate that it was princi-
pally concerned with uncovering evidence of specific statutory violations.52 The
FTC Chairman even stated publicly that the purpose of the investigation was
"to determine expeditiously whether pricing practices in the sale of milk
should be made the subject of a formal adjudication" ;53 in this somewhat ex-
traordinary instance, the very words indicated that the investigation was nar-
rowly focused and pre-prosecutorial.54 In such circumstances a court should
not hesitate to invalidate public proceedings. Where the external indicia are
inconclusive, courts should permit a direct inquiry into the agency's purpose,
They need not be deterred from requiring the testimony of agency officials onl
this issue by the considerations which militate against application of this
technique to congressional investigations. 5 Though it is unlikely that such
testimony would often produce an unqualified admission of a pre-prosecutorial
purpose, it seems equally improbable that the response of responsible agency
officials, such as the commissioners, would often be untrue or distorted. Re-
gardless of the indicia which are viewed as conclusive in particular instances, the
52. The subpoenas initially issued to Kroger and the other two interstate chains stated
that the purpose of the hearings was to obtain information on possible violations of § 2 of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), amending
Clayton Act, § 2, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), prohibiting unfair methods of
competition. FTC News Release, Feb. 28, 1962, TRADE REG. REp. U 10114.10 (1962). In
resubpoenaing Kroger, the FTC referred to violations of "any law administered by the
FTC." FTC News Release, April 27, 1962, TRADE REG. REP. U 10114.11 (1962).
53. Dixon, The Federal Trade Commission at 27.
54. OIn Archer v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) U 70417 (N.D, I11. July
20, 1962), the District Judge who had issued the restraining order in the principal case again
granted injunctive relief against a scheduled public milk-pricing hearing by the FTC. The
hearings had been scheduled to begin in Denver on July 24; after the issue of the restraining
order, the Commission scheduled nonpublic hearings and reissued the subpoenas to the coin-
panies previously served. See TRADE REG. REPD. U 10118.11-12 (1962).
At the least Archer appears to be a less straightforward case, though the court framed
restraining orders in terms virtually identical to those of its previous order in Hall. The
Denver hearings were scheduled pursuant to a broad investigative resolution setting forth
the various grounds of the Commissioes interest in milk-pricing practices and proclaiming
its pursuit of a legislative purpose. This resolution, issued on July 3, 1962, provides that,
"in the public interest and in compliance with the Commission's Rules of Practice, all in-
vestigational hearings [shall] be conducted in public unless otherwise specified in the formal
processes authorized by the Commission." 27 Fed. Reg. 6682 (July 13, 1962).
The number of companies subpoenaed for the Denver hearings was also considerably
larger than in Hall, see TRADE REG. REP. U 10118,11-12 (1962), a circumstance which
in combination with the above resolution would have lent substance to a claim by the
FTC that it was engaged in a valid informing function. Morover, the result in Hall may
have been based in part on the court's evaluation of the record from fifteen previous days of
public hearings, while in Archer the court had no comparable basis for a judgment as to
purpose. Lastly, the Commission's formal announcement of the Denver hearings contained
no reference to suspected violations of law. FTC Release, July 6, 1962, TRADE REG. REP.
10118.10. These considerations suggest that a more extensive inquiry into purpose should
have been undertaken in Archer. See also text at notes 55-56 infra.
55. See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 215-17 (1962).
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essential point is that courts recognize the issue of agency purpose as one of
fact and as one which should not be confused with the separable and prior ques-
tion of the agency's statutory authority for holding informative hearings. While
an agency may be authorized to hold several types of investigative proceed-
ings,56 it is only through close scrutiny of the circumstances in individual in-
stances that relevant distinctions between these types may be discerned and
appropriate procedural requirements imposed.
For those to whom the distinction between hearings intended to inform and
hearings intended to ferret out facts for prosecution is not meaningful, either be-
cause they do not consider the needs of the informing function of sufficient im-
portance to be determinative of due process requirements or because they
believe the evidentiary problems involved in ascertaining the purpose of a
particular proceeding would make the protection illusory, another approach to
reconciling the relative needs of the agency and affected parties may be ap-
pealing. It should be recognized, however, that this approach does not follow
from the premises developed in this Note. If the agency's statute clearly
authorizes it either to recommend legislation or to fashion rules but does not
specifically provide for public hearings, a court could require that potentially
defamatory testimony be taken in private."7 If public informing hearings are
specifically authorized, the agency should have the choice of taking potentially
defamatory testimony in private or granting procedural protections-e.g.,
cross-examination and rebuttal testimony to individuals who have been or
are likely to be defamed and degraded by testimony not inadvertently elicited.
An examination of the contrast between the Civil Rights Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act will illustrate the operation of this approach. There
is abundant evidence that the leitmotiv of the former statute was the develop-
ment of legislative information and recommendations in a highly complex and
unexplored area.58 The statute expressly provided for public hearings, but
required that potentially defamatory statements be taken in private." The
FTC Act, on the other hand, while authorizing the Commission specifically to
develop legislative recommendations,00 did not address itself to the problem of
56. Note the broad enabling clause of the FTC Act, which authorizes the Commission
"to gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to time the
organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any corporation engaged in
commerce... .. Section, 6(a), 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1958). For dis-
cussion of the FTC's various uses of this power, see MacChesney & Murphy, Investigatory
and Enforcement Powers of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo. AVAsir. L. REv. 581
(1940) ; Note, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 671, 679-80, 684-89 (1962).
57. Similar conditions have been attached to the enforcement of investigative subpoenas
where there is a substantial possibility that trade secrets will be disclosed. See FCC v.
Schreiber, 201 F. Supp. 421, 425 (S.D. Cal. 1962) ("it is ordered that the Examiner con-
fine attendance at the hearing to the persons directly involved in the proceedings, their
counsel, experts and witnesses and exclude the general public").
58. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 104(a) (b), 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975
c(a) (b) (1958) ; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-41 (1960).
59. 71 Stat. 634-35 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(e), (g), (i) (1958).
60. 38 Stat 721-22 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1958).
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public hearings 61 or safeguards. 62 The FTC has failed to provide any self-
limiting standards, asserting an unbounded discretion under the statute, and
acknowledging no responsibility for protecting witnesses.0 3 An ambiguously-
motivated FTC public proceeding might, therefore, be strictly scrutinized by a
court, which could direct the use of executive sessions whenever substantial
injury to reputation appears imminent. The primary advantage of resolving
the problem in this fashion would be to afford some protection to witnesses
where the manifest purposes of an investigative proceeding are mixed or am-
biguous, and thus a dominant pre-prosecutorial purpose cannot be ascertained.
Its principal disadvantage would be the obstacles which either secrecy or
cross-examination and similar trial-type procedures might pose to the effec-
tive exercise of the informing power. If the proceeding is in fact designed to
inform, secrecy would impair the free flow of information, confrontation with
one's accusers would seem to have very little meaning, and cross-examination
of adverse witnesses would seem beside the point.
61. The terms of § 6(f) itself detract somewhat from the FTC's claim to possess statu-
tory authorization for what Kroger called a play-by-play broadcast of the investigation.
That section gives the Commission the power "to make public from timc to time such
portions of the information obtained by it hereunder ... as it shall deem expedient in tie
public interest." (Emphasis supplied.) Kroger argued in addition that the duty of the Coin-
mission to subject evidence and testimony to a sifting and weighing process before re-
leasing it to the public could be inferred from Congress' use of the term "information". Reply
Brief for Plaintiff, p. 20, Hall v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) ff 70338 (N.D.
Ill. May 7, 1962).
62. See Hearts of Oak Assurance Co. v. Attorney-General (1932) A.C. 392, where
the House of Lords held that the Industrial Assurance Commissioner had no power to con-
duct a public inquiry into a company subject to his statutory jurisdiction. In construing
the Industrial Assurance Act, which was silent on the question, Lord MacMillan observed
that:
[T] here is also no provision for the parties under suspicion being afforded any indica-
tion of the offenses of which they are suspected, or being permitted to be represented
or defend themselves in any way, although, if the Attorney-General is right, the as
yet unverified suspicions of the Commissioner or his inspector may be made public and
communicated to the press. Anything more repugnant to elementary ideas of fairness
and propriety it would be difficult to conceive.
Id. at 402. This case suggests that an appropriate rationale for requiring private hearings
where an agency lacks specific authorization for public hearings and the purpose is not clear-
ly an informing one would be along the lines of Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-99,
507-08 (1959) ; cf. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 108 (1946).
63. See Brief for Defendant, pp. 18-19, 32-33, Hall v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. (1962
Trade Cas.) f 70338 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1962).
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